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T
WO RECENT LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS are threatening to
restrict women’s access to reproductive healthcare in
Russia. The first, the Family Code Amendment
(Amendment), a draft law, seeks to restrict a woman’s right
to abortion by recognizing fetuses as people, thereby granting them
the rights held by children after birth. The second law, the Abortion
Decree (Decree), issued in August 2003, decreases the number of non-
medical reasons for which a woman may obtain an abortion during
her second trimester of pregnancy. 
These legislative maneuvers are significant because they create
conflict between Russian domestic law and binding international law.
The Family Code Amendment was introduced to bring Russia’s laws
in line with its obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC), which Russian lawmakers have narrowly and question-
ably interpreted as granting rights to unborn children. Restrictions
placed on women’s access to healthcare by both measures, however, con-
flict with Russia’s obligations as a state party to the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).
This article explores the origin of the two laws, Russia’s obligations
under the CRC and CEDAW, and the principles that govern the inter-
pretation of these laws. Abortion is defined as a medical procedure for
the purposes of this analysis because it is technically a medical surgery
and is commonly understood as such in Russian society.
THE HISTORY OF ABORTION IN RUSSIA
RUSSIA WAS THE FIRST COUNTRY IN THE WORLD to legalize abor-
tion. In 1920, the Bolshevik government granted women the right to
abortion. This right was then limited under Stalin in the early 1930s,
and eliminated in 1936, primarily in the name of promoting popula-
tion growth. The procedure was again legalized in 1955 after Stalin’s
death and has remained legal since. 
Russian women have relied on abortion as a primary means of
birth control since 1955. During the Soviet era, abortion was virtual-
ly the only form of birth control available. Today, some experts esti-
mate that Russian women have thirteen abortions for every ten live
births, as compared to about 2.5 abortions per ten live births in the
United States. This is despite a reported fifty percent drop in abortions
in recent years. Russian women today are familiar with abortion and
continue to rely on it above modern forms of contraception, often
because they are not educated about modern family planning meth-
ods.
In addition to a widespread lack of access to reliable contracep-
tion, the dynamics of gender, sexual relations, and economics con-
tribute to Russian women’s reliance on abortion. During the Soviet
period, women struggled to cope with their “double burden;” society
expected them to excel in the workforce while maintaining an ideal-
ized maternal standard. Following the breakup of the Soviet Union,
women faced enormous economic challenges and obstacles to sup-
porting themselves and their families. The prevalence of sexual harass-
ment and domestic violence in Russian society compounded these
economic challenges. Women continue to be the primary caretakers of
the family in addition to working outside of the home, and often deal
with gender discrimination in one or both settings. Consequently,
many women choose to limit their family size because they do not
have the time or resources to provide for more children, and continue
to turn to abortion to meet their family planning needs. 
The issue of population growth is also important to consider in
exploring the history of abortion in Russia. Traditionally, great empha-
sis has been placed on population growth because increased population
has translated into a larger work force. Such an emphasis likely began
as a reaction to massive losses of life in the Bolshevik Revolution, the
forced collectivization of agriculture, World War I, and the famines
that followed. This sentiment remains strong today, but the population
does not. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has seen a sharp
decline in its life expectancy and birth rate. The United Nations
Population Fund puts Russia’s 2003 life expectancy at 60.8 years for
men and 73.1 for women down from 61.5 and 73.6, respectively, in
1996. In the world’s most developed countries, life expectancy is 72.1
years for men and 79.4 years for women. The birth rate in Russia in
2003, calculated by births per 1000 women aged 15-19, was thirty
births per year, compared with a world total of fifty in 2003 and thir-
ty-seven for Russia in 1996. Today, it is estimated that Russia’s popula-
tion is declining by approximately one million people per year.
ABORTION: THE LAWS OF THE LAND
DESPITE THESE CHANGES, RUSSIAN LAWS on abortion remain rela-
tively liberal. Abortion during the first trimester is legal for any reason,
and during the second trimester it is legal for some non-medical and
all medical reasons (although in practice there may still be obstacles for
some women, such as doctors who do not want to perform abortions).
In 1996, the Russian government passed Bill No.567 which created
thirteen “social situations” in which a woman could obtain an abor-
tion between the twelfth and twenty-second weeks of pregnancy. This
list permitted abortions in limited cases, such as when one parent was
unemployed or when the family already had three or more children.
This law was the first limitation on the right to abortion since the
Stalin era. 
The Family Code Amendment and Abortion Decree have since
been introduced to curb the continued reliance on abortion in Russian
culture. While women should have greater access to contraception and
should not have to rely so heavily on abortion, the Amendment and
Decree do not adequately address the complex social issues underlying
Russia’s high abortion rate. The Amendment and Decree will not nec-
essarily reduce the number of abortions. Rather than focusing on
restricting a woman’s right to abortion, Russia should increase access
to and education about reliable means of birth control.
THE FAMILY CODE AMENDMENT
ON FEBRUARY 5, 2003, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION introduced a
draft amendment to its Family Code “with regard to the issue of safe-
guarding children’s rights before birth.” Its purported purpose is to
guard the rights of children before birth and to bring Russian law in
compliance with international law, pursuant to its obligations under
the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Amendment is still
in the legislative process at this time.
This draft legislation defines a late-term fetus as a person, there-
by granting fetuses all the legal rights of children. Most importantly, it
grants fetuses the right to life. The draft law defines a viable fetus as
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an unborn child, and states that fetal viability begins at the twenty-
fifth or twenty-sixth week of pregnancy. Previously, unborn children
were not granted specific rights but were recognized only for reasons
of inheritance under Russia’s Civil Code. 
THE ABORTION DECREE
ON AUGUST 11, 2003, THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT issued Decree
No.485 (Decree), which reduced the “list of social indications for
induced termination of pregnancy” from thirteen to four. Between the
twelfth and twenty-second weeks, a woman is still theoretically
allowed unlimited access for medical reasons, such as one that threat-
ens the life of the woman. A woman is also permitted to have an abor-
tion during this time in the following cases: (1) a court ruling related
to depriving a person of parental rights or restricting one’s parental
rights; (2) pregnancy resulting from rape; (3) incarceration in a deten-
tion center; and (4) a husband’s severe disability or death at the time
of the spouse’s pregnancy.
According to the Decree, women in their twelfth to twenty-second
weeks of pregnancy must seek permission from the doctor at the local
obstetric clinic and, in some cases, the local social welfare organization,
to obtain an abortion. Women who want an abortion but are denied
permission are left to either find another way to abort the child or to
carry the pregnancy to term. The requirement of such permission leads
to more late-term and illegal abortions, which are more dangerous for
women. Government statistics show that thirty percent of maternal
deaths in Russia result from late-term surgical abortions. These numbers
only account for the government-monitored abortions, which comprise
only a fraction of the total number of abortions performed. Illegal abor-
tions are likely to increase with more abortion restrictions.
POPULATION PUSH AND THE NEW RELIGION
BOTH THE FAMILY CODE AMENDMENT and the Abortion Decree
are part of a new push to roll back abortion rights, effectively restrict-
ing women’s right to healthcare. While there may be many reasons for
the shift in the tide of reproductive rights in Russia, two have made a
noticeable impact. First, the Russian Orthodox Church, which
staunchly opposes abortion, has grown in popularity in recent years.
Second, a sharp decrease in population and recent increase in nation-
alism have rekindled a desire for population growth in Russia.
Religion, which was suppressed during communist rule, has
gained significant popularity since the fall of communism. Even
President Vladimir Putin, a former KGB officer charged with decreas-
ing the influence of the church, is now a practicing Russian Orthodox.
In 2001, he stated that “since time immemorial, our country has been
called ‘holy Russia’… emphasiz[ing] the special role assumed by Russia
voluntarily, as the keeper of Christianity… It is therefore extremely
important, useful and timely to get back to this source.” Putin’s trans-
formation reflects the growing popularity of religion in Russia and
influence of the Orthodox Church. The Orthodox Church is a firm
and outspoken opponent of abortion, which it regards as murder. The
Church also denounces contraception because it interferes with repro-
duction, the main goal of marriage according to the Church. 
Statistics indicating that Russia’s population is presently decreas-
ing further reinforce the religious argument. Some scientists estimate
that Russia’s population will fall by one-third by 2075 if it continues
its present decline of almost one million people per year. The decrease
has been attributed to a range of factors, such as violence (particular-
ly the conflict in Chechnya) and general health problems associated
with drinking, poor nutrition, and, most importantly, a decrease in
births. To combat the decrease in population, some social commenta-
tors, scientists and politicians have begun pushing women to have
more children. This population decrease has elicited strong reactions
throughout Russian society because of its traditional desire for robust
population growth. As child bearers, women have received the major-
ity of the blame for this decrease. In the eyes of some lawmakers, the
Amendment and Decree are only the first step in limiting a woman’s
right to control her fertility, reproductive health and sexuality. 
RUSSIA’S OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CRC
THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, which Russia
ratified on August 16,1990, enumerates rights for children. It entered
into force on September 2, 1990. As of November 14, 2003, a total of
192 countries have ratified the CRC. 
The Family Code Amendment relies on the Preamble to the
CRC to support its assertion that fetuses are entitled to certain rights.
The Preamble states, “the child, by reason of his physical and mental
immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate
legal protection, before as well as after birth.” The Russian govern-
ment interpreted this as granting rights to unborn children under
international law. In bestowing rights on fetuses, the drafters of the
Amendment also rely on the CRC’s provisions that “every child has
the inherent right to life” and that children have the right to healthy
development. Proponents of the Amendment reason that, because the
CRC provides children with the rights to registration, a name, a
nationality and, as much as possible, to know and be cared for by his
or her parents, full compliance with the CRC requires that a child
should “have the right to life and healthy development before his birth
and registration.”
This interpretation is problematic because the drafters of the
Family Code Amendment not only failed to interpret the Preamble of
the CRC in light of other binding international law, but also did so in
a way that directly contradicts both the Russian Constitution and
CEDAW. The CRC does not define when a fetus becomes a child. The
CRC Preamble language granting children protection “before as well
as after birth” was a long-fought compromise by the drafters that
allows individual states to define their own views on abortion. Because
abortion is controversial, the CRC refrains from granting rights to
unborn children while allowing parties the option to do so in their
national legislation. That compromise, and the freedom for countries
to choose their own interpretation, is not meant to grant states parties
license to use this specific language as justification for pro-life legisla-
tion, but rather to give states parties the space to do so if they choose.
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As the US Delegation argued during the drafting of the Convention,
“any attempt to institutionalize a particular point of view on abortion
in the draft Convention would make the Convention unacceptable
from the outset to countries espousing a different point of view.” The
Preamble language is simply a means for the CRC to expand its list of
signatories and avoid participation in a very controversial argument. 
The Family Code Amendment is also in direct conflict with the
Russian Constitution. The Constitution states that “The basic rights
and liberties of the human being shall be inalienable and shall belong
to everyone from birth.” It also provides that it is the supreme law of
the land and that the “recognized principles and norms of the interna-
tional law and the international treaties of the Russian Federation shall
be a component part of its legal system.” Finally, “If an international
treaty of the Russian Federation stipulates other rules than those stip-
ulated by the law, the rules of the international treaty shall apply.”
Thus, the Family Code Amendment appears to be facially invalid
under the Russian Constitution. 
RUSSIA’S OBLIGATIONS UNDER CEDAW
THE CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) directly addresses a woman’s
right to abortion. Russia ratified
CEDAW on September 3, 1981 and
signed (but has yet to ratify) the
Optional Protocol on May 8, 2001.
CEDAW provides that women
have an unequivocal, fundamental
right to plan the spacing of their
children. This right is echoed
throughout the Convention. The
right to healthcare and the right to
abortion as a component of health-
care and family planning are inte-
gral to providing the services needed
to fulfill a woman’s right to family
planning. General Recommenda-
tion 19 on violence against women
mandates that “States parties should ensure that measures are taken to
prevent coercion in regard to fertility and reproduction, and to ensure
that women are not forced to seek unsafe medical procedures such as
illegal abortion because of lack of appropriate services in regard to fer-
tility control.”
General Recommendation 24 to Article 12 of CEDAW, which
provides for a woman’s general right to healthcare, details the steps
states must take to fulfill this obligation. States must take appropriate
legislative actions to ensure a woman’s right to healthcare. The General
Recommendation says that states should not restrict a woman’s access
to health clinics by requiring authorization from a husband, partner,
parent or health authority, or because they are unmarried or women.
A state also should not criminalize medical procedures specific to
women. The General Recommendation further requires that states
take measures to ensure timely access to “the range of services that are
related to family planning, in particular, and to sexual and reproduc-
tive health in general,” and advises that a high number of couples that
would like to limit their family size but do not have access to contra-
ception is a possible indication of a breach of a country’s duty to pro-
vide healthcare. Finally, states parties should “Prioritize the prevention
of unwanted pregnancy through family planning and sex education
and reduce maternal mortality through safe motherhood services and
prenatal assistance. When possible, legislation criminalizing abortion
should be amended, in order to withdraw punitive measures imposed
on women who undergo abortion.”
Russia’s Abortion Decree violates its obligations under CEDAW
both in fact and in spirit. CEDAW requires states to provide women
with safe and accessible means to control their fertility before resort-
ing to abortions. Although Russia, in its 1999 report to CEDAW,
claims that it has made strides in this department, the fact that women
still rely on abortion as a primary means of birth control is evidence
that there is a great deal of work still left to do. Moreover, the purpose
of the Abortion Decree is to create barriers to the standard of health-
care that CEDAW specifically protects. The language of General
Recommendation 24 states that women should not have to seek the
approval of a third party to receive medical care and that states should
not criminalize women for seeking abortions. Under the language of
the Russian Constitution, which defers to international binding law,
this conflict would make the Abortion Decree null and void.
APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
IN ITS TWO-PRONGED APPROACH to restricting abortion rights,
Russia has relied on the CRC for justification while ignoring its obli-
gations under CEDAW. This undermines the spirit of both conven-
tions by focusing on criminalizing
abortion while failing to allocate
resources for the prevention of
unwanted pregnancies. However, the
resolution of conflicts in internation-
al law, particularly those pertaining
to abortion, remain undefined and
extremely controversial.
Russia’s obligations to the CRC
and CEDAW cannot be looked at in
isolation. As a party to multiple
binding conventions, Russia must
look at the whole of its obligations
and interpret them so as to harmo-
nize their goals and remain faithful
to their spirits. Therefore, the silence
of the CRC does not grant Russia the license to interpret the CRC in
a way that directly conflicts with CEDAW.
The Vienna Convention, which governs the Law of Treaties,
mandates that “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it
and must be performed by them in good faith.” The Vienna
Convention also mandates that when states are parties to successive
treaties relating to the same subject matter and one treaty “specifies that
it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as incompatible with,
an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty prevail.”
Finally, with regard to interpretation of a treaty, the Vienna
Convention states that the “ordinary meaning” should apply. When the
“ordinary meaning” is unclear, one may reference the preparatory doc-
uments to the treaty to clarify. 
Pursuant to these provisions, Russia should look to its obliga-
tions under CEDAW on the subject of abortion rather than relying on
the CRC. First and foremost, Russia has misinterpreted the language in
the CRC to justify restricting women’s rights. The CRC does not give
rights to unborn children. Second, Russia’s interpretation directly con-
flicts with its obligations to women under CEDAW. Women have the
right to plan their families and to access healthcare without state inter-
vention. Russia’s interpretation shirks its obligation to a good faith per-
formance of the Conventions because a good faith effort would attempt
to harmonize the provisions rather than create blatant conflicts. 
53
“. . . the resolution of conflicts
in international law,
particularly those pertaining to
abortion, remain undefined
and extremely controversial.” 
       
3
Stewart: Curbing Reliance On Abortion In Russia
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2004
Because access to abortion is an important component of
healthcare and family planning, Russia should defer to CEDAW.
CEDAW fully articulates women’s rights to access healthcare and
family planning services. Although the CRC also addresses the rights
of mothers to prenatal and postnatal care, CEDAW is the interna-
tional authority on this area of law. Moreover, both CEDAW and the
CRC contain provisions that say they should not conflict with any
other international law or national law that is more conducive to real-
izing the rights that the treaty seeks to embody. For Russia to follow
the CRC in good faith it must look to CEDAW for all obligations
related to family planning and women’s access to healthcare. Finally,
the legislative history to the CRC shows that the Preamble clause on
which Russia has based its interpretation was meant to be subject to
other treaties governing the same subject matter. The clause was pur-
posefully silent on abortion. Hence, CEDAW is the ruling authority
on women’s right to abortion.
Russia’s interpretation of the CRC is not consistent with the spir-
it of either convention. The goal of both conventions is to provide for
the rights and health of women and children, and Russia’s plan under-
mines its ability to provide for these. By narrowly focusing on restrict-
ing access to abortion, Russia burdens the health and economic wel-
fare of women and families through unwanted pregnancies and dan-
gerous botched abortions. At the same time, Russia has neglected to
provide adequate access to and education on pregnancy prevention or
welfare resources to support the new children. 
CONCLUSION
RESTRICTING ACCESS TO ABORTION ALONE will not decrease heavy
reliance on abortion in Russia. Russian women have relied on abortions
for years and will continue to do so whether they are legal or not. Instead,
Russia must focus on providing full access to affordable and reliable con-
traception and reproductive health education. The CRC Committee’s
1999 Concluding Observations on Russia stress similar goals, recom-
mending that Russia ensure the effectiveness of measures taken to edu-
cate adolescents on contraception and STDs, strengthen reproductive
health and family planning services, and take further steps to prevent
teenage pregnancy and abortion. Moreover, as a country with a skyrock-
eting HIV/AIDS rate (the Commonwealth of Independent States has the
fastest-growing HIV/AIDS rate in the world), it is imperative that Russia
focus on health education and develop prevention and access networks.
With greater power, voice, and freedom, women would likely find
ways to control their reproductive health without relying on such inva-
sive procedures as abortion. Russia must take action to provide women
with greater control over their education, their sexual health and their
family lives. In order to reduce reliance on abortion, women need the
education and ability to plan their families in a reliable and noninva-
sive way. It is likely that the transition away from abortion to modern
forms of contraception will be long and complicated. The Abortion
Decree and Family Code Amendment, which offer no accompanying
legislation to provide additional family planning resources, will only
make this process more difficult and painful. HRB
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the workload and the duration of the time necessary to finally decide
cases. However, now it seems that the proposed reform of the existing
system would leave claimants whose applications are rejected on the
above considered basis without a remedy at all. Then, where and who
will offer that lost remedy? If the Court decides to examine the merits
of a case and finds a violation, it may decide under Article 41 of the
Convention that the respondent state should pay just satisfaction to
the victim of the violation. Under the new proposals, that possibility
would no longer exist when the Court decides to reject a case, notwith-
standing the fact that the applicant has fulfilled the current admissibil-
ity requirements. 
In the introduction of our contribution we opened with the
statements made by the president of the European Court of Human
Rights. Let us conclude with a statement made by Judge Antônio
Augusto Cançado Trindade, President of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, at the hearing of the European Court of Human
Rights on the occasion of the opening of the 2004 judicial year in
Strasbourg on January 22:
At procedural law level, one of the basic issues dwelt
upon by both Courts has been precisely that of the access
to justice at [the] international level, achieved under the
two Conventions by means of the operation of the
respective provisions on the international jurisdiction of
the two Human Rights Courts and on the right of indi-
vidual petition. I regard those provisions of such a fun-
damental character—as true fundamental clauses
(cláusulas pétreas) of the international protection of
human rights—that any attempt to undermine them
would threaten the functioning of the whole mechanism
of protection under the two regional Conventions. They
constitute the basic pillars of the mechanism whereby
the emancipation of the individual vis-à-vis his own
State is achieved. This outlook grows in importance for
having come at a time when the establishment of a new
international human rights Tribunal (an African Court
on Human and Peoples’ Rights) under the 1998
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights appears forthcoming.
We cannot do more than strongly underline this firm statement,
which does justice to those who are seeking justice, those who were
disregarded or disappointed at the domestic level and those who have
placed their hope in seeking justice at an international level. A propos-
al made by Mahoney for the introduction of a pilot-judgment for deal-
ing with situations generating repetitive cases is worth considering.
Under this proposal, the Court would take up a test case and suspend
the examination of all similar applications. If a violation of a structur-
al or organizational nature is found, the respondent state would be
obliged, in order to execute the judgment, not only to eliminate the
source of the violation for the future but also to make available a
retroactive national remedy to provide appropriate relief for other vic-
tims of the violation, including in particular persons who had lodged
an application with the Court in Strasbourg. 
This proposal should be explored further because it offers the
original victim a measure of redress while, at the same time, it creates
a structure that will not overload the European Court of Human
Rights with applications that deal with the same issue often in relation
to the same member state. It is proposals for change that do not restrict
the right to individual petition that may lead to the final conclusion
that the European Court of Human Rights will be a success story in
the next ten years and thereafter, since it is this very element of the
European system that has made it successful and that has inspired
hope for the weakest - the individual. HRB
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